Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 5, Number 2 (October 1967)

Article 8

Sidmay Ltd. et al. v. Whettam Investments Ltd.
(1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 194,[1966] 1 O.R. 457,
(1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 (Ont. C.A.)
Clifford S. Nelson
Ray L. Steele

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary

Citation Information
Nelson, Clifford S. and Steele, Ray L.. "Sidmay Ltd. et al. v. Whettam Investments Ltd. (1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 194,[1966] 1 O.R. 457,
(1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 (Ont. C.A.)." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 5.2 (1967) : 282-295.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol5/iss2/8

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 5:267

Although one might raise a few questions of fact or law in connection with the Tilco decision, it cannot be seriously disputed in
the result that the respondents (with the possible exception of Clark
and Skurjat) were aware of the probable consequence of their actions
and got what they bargained for. Having deliberately set for themselves a collision course with the courts they cannot be heard to complain of the resulting impact. Having held themselves out as sacrificial
lambs for their political cause, it would lie ill in their mouths to
complain of their jail sentences.
ARcHIE GRAY CAMPBELL"

MORTGAGES
Sidmay Ltd. et al. v. Whettam Investments Ltd. (1966), 54 D.L.R.
(2d) 194; [19661 1 O.R. 457; (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 (Ont. C.A.)
MORTGAGES-ILLEGALITY.
NOTE:
The decision in the Sidmay case becomes more significant when
one considers the consequences that would have arisen had the
decision at trial been upheld. Thus, in addition to dealing with
the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, the writers discussed
at length the judgment of Grant J. at trial.

Perhaps no case decided within the last few years has caused
as much controversy as the Sidmay case.' The implications of the
trial decision threw both the business community and the legal profession of Ontario into a state of uncertainty regarding the consequences of non-registration under "lending" statutes. At trial, failure
to register under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct 2 resulted in a
windfall to a borrower; however, the Court of Appeal unanimously
reversed this decision.3 It is the purpose of this note to examine the
efficacy and reasoning of these results.
Background and Facts
At trial, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that a
mortgage given by the defendant Company was null and void as
against the plaintiff mortgagor since the defendant had failed to
register under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct. The defendant
was in the business of lending money on the security of real estate;
to this end, it was registered under both the CorporationsAct 4 and
the Mortgage Broker's RegistrationAct.5 Since Whettam Investments
* Archie Gray Campbell is a member of the 1967 graduating class of
Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 Sidmay Ltd. et aZ. v. Whettam Investments Ltd. (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d)
358 (Ont. C.A.).
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 222, s. 133.
3 Supra, note 1.
4 R.S.O. 1960, c. 71, s. 3(1).
5 R.S.O. 1960, c. 244.
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Ltd. was not restricted by the terms of its charter to five shareholders,
but rather to fifty, it did not fall within the provisions of section 3 (2)
of the CorporationAct (Ont.). Had it fallen within this section, there
would have been no necessity for registration under the Loan and
Trust CorporationsAct.
In this case, there was a mortgage made to the plaintiff Company
in good faith for the value of $308,250.6 Subsequently the plaintiff
7
Company discovered that the defendant had failed to register.
Decision
Trial: (a) The mortgage was declared illegal, void and unenforceable. 8
(b) Common law allowed the plaintiff to retain legal title to the
land, and also to keep possession of the loan.9
(c) Equity did not apply so as to put the plaintiff on terms. 10
Court of Appeal: The mortgage was found to be valid" [Wells J.A.
concurred with Kelly J.A.; Laskin J.A. wrote a separate opinion].
Issues and Arguments
I Ultra Vires
Although not mentioned at the trial nor on Appeal, the doctrine of
corporate ultra vires in the Bonanza Creek12 sense deserves some
discussion. Assuming that this doctrine is applicable, rather than the
common law rule of illegality, then it seems that the defendant could
enforce the mortgages or force the plaintiff to repay the loan on the
basis of money had and received. 13 Furthermore the defendant could
14
assert the doctrine of tracing as laid down in Sinclair v. Brougham.
Under Part I of the Corporations Act (Ont.) incorporation is
pursuant to letters patent and ultra vires in the Bonanza Creek sense
would apply. Also section 1(b) of the Loan and Trust Corporations
Act defines a loan corporation as an "incorporated company." As a
result the defendant might have argued ultra vires. However, section
2 of Part I of the CorporationsAct (Ont.),15 specifically states that
this part does not apply to a company coming within the meaning of
the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct. As well, incorporation under
There were in fact a number of mortgages amounting to $308,250.
Supra, note 2.
Sidmay Ltd. et al. v. Whettam Investments Ltd. (1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d)
194 at 205.
6
7
8

9 Id., at 210.
10

Id., at 209.

11 Supra,note 1, at 374-5, 383.

12 This case decided that even though a company went beyond its stated
objects, since it was created pursuant to letters patent and had the capacity
of a natural person, any of its transactions would still be enforceable. The
only penalty this company could suffer would be a revocation of its charter
through proceedings by way of a writ of sciere facias, instituted by the
Attorney.General.
13 Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v. R., [1916] 1 A.C. 566.
14 [1914] A.C. 857; [1948] Ch. 465.
15 R.S.O. 1960, c. 71.
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the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct is effected by virtue of registration and ultra vires in the Bonanza Creek sense would not apply. 16
Furthermore, it would seem absurd that a company, by relying
on ultra vires, could extricate itself from an illegal act. Ultra vires
and illegality are two distinct and separate principles of law. It is no
answer to the defendant to say that a valid ultravires act will exclude
the consequences of non-registration, as even a natural person has
limitations imposed by law on his capacities-one of these being, that
when he commits an illegal act he is subject to the penalty applicable.
In the case of Re Mutual Investments,17 where a company was acting
in violation of the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct Riddell J., looked
only to illegality and not to ultra vires.
Thus, on the basis of the above arguments, it is highly doubtful
if the doctrine of ultra vires could be successfully invoked.
II Illegality
Under section 133 of the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct, loan
corporations, loaning land corporations, and trust companies are prohibited from carrying on their business unless registered under the
Act. No mention is made of what happens to transactions carried out
by companies that have not complied with the registration requirement. It could be argued in favour of the defendant company that,
although the business itself was illegal, its transactions with the plaintiff company were not illegal but enforceable.
In the case of Montreal Trust Co. v. Abitibi Power and Paper Co.
Ltd.,'8 where the defendant company had entered into a contract in
contravention of section 133 of the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct, 9
Kingstone J. held that this Act did not apply. Although the main
ground of the decision was based on the fact that this transaction
was an isolated one, most of Mr. Justice Kingstone's judgment was
concerned with the question of what would have been the effect on
the transaction itself had the defendant company fallen within the
Act. Kingstone J. emphatically stated that the mortgage was not
illegal as there was nothing in the statute invalidating the transaction
itself.20
In rendering his trial decision, Mr. Justice Grant did not refer
to the above case, but rather looked to the case of Commercial Life
Assurance Co. v. Drever2l which seems to discount Kingstone J.'s
obiter. In this case, Locke J. referred to the earlier case of Bartlett
v. Vinor 22 where Holt C.J. said that a penalty under a statute implies
a prohibition and any contract made under such statute is, as a result,
16 Supra, note 12.
17 56 O.L.R. 29.
Is [1937] O.R. 939.

19 R.S.O. 1927, c. 223, s. 135(1) (section 133 of the present Act).

20 [1937] O.R. 939, 946.
21 [1948] S.C.R. 306.

22 (1693) Carth. 252.

1967]

Case Comment

void even though the statute does not expressly say so.23 The Commercial Life case, however, involved a specific prohibitory provision
in a statute 4 and could have been decided without any reference to
Holt C.J.'s remarks-at best, Locke J.'s allusion to Bartlett v. Vinor5
was obiter.
In his judgment Grant J. referred to a number of cases 26 which,
like the Commercial Life case, dealt with statutes including specific
prohibitory sections vis & vis the transactions as well as the entire
business. It is submitted, that Grant J. should have recognized the
distinction between the Loan and Trust Corporations Act and the
statutes dealt with in the above cases. Under the former Act, there
are no specific prohibitory sections as regards the transaction; thus,
it seems that it was open to Grant J. to follow Kingstone J.'s interpretation in the Montreal Trust case. 27
Grant J.'s finding that the contract itself was illegal was discounted by Mr. Justice Kelly in the Court of Appeal. 28 Kelly J. stated
that even assuming the defendant had been operating its business in
contravention of section 133 of the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct,
this would not of itself have invalidated the transaction; since there
is no mention in the Act of avoiding or rendering null such a contract.
It is submitted that the conclusion reached on appeal is correct;
however, it is perhaps unfortunate that the Court did not refer to
the Montreal Trust case as authority for this proposition.
III Statutory Interpretation
(a) Under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct
Grant J. held that the plaintiff company fell within a class of
persons protected by the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct. It is submitted, if considered as a whole, it becomes evident that this act is
designed to protect shareholders and creditors but not borrowers. If
this interpretation is correct, what in effect Grant J. did in giving
the plaintiff the $309,250 was to harm the interest of the shareholders
and creditors-the very persons the Act is supposed to protect.
Mr. Justice Grant quotes section 4(1g) of the Act to illustrate
his contention. This section provides that satisfactory security is to
be taken for the fidelity of persons in control of the funds of the
The Loan and Trust CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 222, s. 161.
The ReaZ Estate Agent's Licensing Act, R.S.A. 1942, c. 318.
S pra,note 22.
Kocotis v. D'Angelo, [1958] O.R. 104, Victorian Daylesford Syndicate
Ltd. v. Dott [1905] 2 Ch. 624, Brown v. Moore (1902), 325 C.R. 93.
27 Kingstone J.'s decision was referred to in MASTEN AND FRASER COMPANY LAw o CANADA (4th ed.) 1941), pp. 407-8. Montreal Trust Co. v. Abitibi
Power and Paper Co. Ltd. et al. [1938] O.R. 81, 82, Montreal Trust Co. v.
Abitibi Power and Paper Co., Ltd. et al. [1938] O.R. 589, Montreal Trust Co.
v. Abitibi Power and Paper Co. Ltd. et al. [1940] O.W.N. 307, 308, Montreal
Trust Co. v. Abitibi Power and Paper Co. Ltd. et al. [1943] A.C. 536, 539.
It should also be noted that Kingstone J.'s statements were not brought
to the attention of Grant J. However, it still remains that this is an argument
that could have been used.
28 Supra note 1 at 375.
23
24
25
26

286

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 5:267

corporation. In fact, this is to protect shareholders and creditorsnot borrowers like the present mortgagor who has already received
the loan money and no longer needs protection. The safeguards that
this mortgagor needs are safeguards in areas such as unconscionable
interest rates and false advertising; however, these considerations are
not in issue here. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Kelly
stated that the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.O. 1960,
c. 410 is the type of legislation that persons in the plaintiffs' position
can look to for protection. 29
Section 43 of the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct is another
section, similar to section 4 (1g), in that requires persons who are
in control of the corporation's funds to furnish security, again providing for the protection of shareholders and creditors. Also, section
4 (Ii) is definitely for the protection of creditors as it restricts the
company so that it cannot reduce the number of shareholders to less
than twenty-five. 30 Under section 8, $300,000 of stock must be subscribed for by at least twenty-five subscribers each having shares of
an aggregate value of at least $1,000-obviously creditors are concerned with the amount of paid up capital held by the loaning corporations, whereas mortgagors, on receiving their loans are not concerned with this at all. Grant J. refers to section 19 which requires
shareholders' meetings at specified times. Again, this provision deals
with the internal organization of the company and is in the shareholders' interests. It is submitted, on the basis of these provisions,
that the whole Act is designed to protect shareholders and creditors.
It certainly affords no protection to a debtor mortgagor, a point which
Mr. Justice Grant completely ignored.
The Court of Appeal completely reversed Mr. Justice Grant on
this issue and held that the plaintiff was not of a class of persons
which fell within the protection of the Act. 31 There are a number of
approaches a court may utilize in interpreting a statute: historical,
functional, etymological, and the approach known as searching for
legislative intent. Mr. Justice Kelly employed the historical and functional tests. From a functional point of view he was in agreement
with the opinion expressed above-that the sections discussed at trial
were for the protection of shareholders and creditors not borrowers.
In discussing this, Kelly J.A. stated:
•.. The provision with respect to minimum capital, limitation on borrowing powers fixed relation to paid-up capital, restriction on the type and
size of loans entitled to be made, provisions for the furnishing of financial
information, description of the type of security to be accepted for loans,
are indicative of an intention to afford protection to those whose money,
in one form or another, comes into the hands of a corporation which
proposes to invest that money in its own name and which holds itself
out as engaged in the business of lending that money. None of the
provisions of the Act are appropriate for the protection of a borrower.32
29
30

Id., at 373.

This section also entitles creditors to sue shareholders for the unpaid
balance of their shares.
31 Supra note 1 at 372-374.
32 Id., at 373.
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Before discussing Mr. Justice Kelly's use of the historical approach, it should be mentioned that this type of analysis has been
frequently ignored or overlooked by Ontario courts in the past. It is
submitted that a correct application of this approach should reinforce
the functional approach, leading to the same result. By attacking a
problem on these two levels and arriving at the same conclusions on
both planes, a court will reach an authoritative result.
Mr. Justice Kelly's method involved the tracing of the development of statutes dealing with building and friendly societies that were
established in the early part of the nineteenth century.3 3 These
34
statutes culminated in the present Loan and Trust CorporationsAct.
It should also be noted that loan companies such as Whettam Investments had their origins in these friendly and building societies. The
friendly societies were in actuality mutual insurance funds set up for
the benefit of contributors and their families; while building societies
were to help contributing members to build homes.35 Since 1854 legislators have often sought to protect the creditors and members of such
societies through various statutes. Credit unions and mutual assistance
36
funds, it was thought, would be of benefit to "industrious classes",
and thus incidentally benefit the well being of the community as a
whole. As mentioned above, Kelly J.A. pointed out that the Loan and
Trust CorporationsAct developed from the former statutes dealing
with friendly and building societies. Thus it logically follows that the
Act was designed to protect the shareholders and creditors of Whet37
tam Investments, rather than borrowers, such as the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the method used and result reached by the
Court of Appeal were excellent-it is hoped that this type of analysis
may be used more frequently in the future.
33

Id., at 367.

Id., at 367. (see diagram)
Id., at 367.
Id., at 368.
37 Kelly J.A. at page 372, stated:
"While the earlier loan companies Acts may have been intended to encourage their loaning activities to help in the development of the country,
the incorporation into a single Act of the provisions of the Acts as to
building societies, loan companies and trust companies, in my view indicates that the purpose of that Act was to exercise a form of control over
the incorporation and operation of corporations which lend to the public
funds drawn from a wide clientele of depositors, debenture holders and
other persons in a creditor relationship to the corporation to the end
that some measure of protection may be offered to those who entrust,
or are exposed to solicitation to entrust, their funds to the corporation.
In seeking for a legislative purpose for bringing such diverse operations
under the same umbrella, the recognizable common denominator is the
intention to protect the money of the public deposited with, loaned or
entrusted to or invested in, the corporations made subject to the provisions
of the Act for the purpose of enabling the corporation to lend such money
mainly on the security of mortgages on real estate."
34
35
36
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(b) General Guidelines:
In the case Coloquhoun v. Brooks,38 Lord Herschell said that
when looking for legislative intent one should view a statute in its
entirety. Looked at in isolation, section 133 of the Loan and Trust
CorporationsAct seems to encompass people in general (i.e. it seems
that any one could bring an action under this section); however,
when viewed as a whole, only a particular class of persons should be
allowed to bring an action and succeed in having a transaction declared
illegal and void-creditors, and shareholders.
In Way v. City of St. Thomas et al.,39 Teetzel J. stated,
It is another well settled rule of construction that when the language of
the legislature admits of two constructions and if construed one way
would lead to obvious injustice, the courts act upon the view that such a
result could not have been
intended unless the intention has been manifested in express words. 40

Again it is to be noted that there is no specific prohibitory section vis
. vis transactions under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct.
IV Delimitation and Scope of the Defendant's Business (Not argued
at trial)
The defendant was incorporated as a private company pursuant
to the CorporationsAct (1953);41 therefore, by virtue of section 23
of this Act it had certain ancilliary powers, namely:
To invest and deal with moneys of the company not immediately required
for its objects in such manner as it may be determined. 42

As well, the defendant was registered under the Mortgage Brokers
RegistrationAct, 43 thus allowing it to carry on the business of lending
money on the security of real estate." Whettam conceded that it did
not fall within section 3(2) of the CorporationsAct (Ont.) as by its
charter it was not restricted to five shareholders. Even though the
defendant was registered under the CorporationsAct (Ont.) and the
Mortgage Broker's Registration Act, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant initially had the choice of registration under either section
3(2) of the CorporationsAct (Ont.) or the Loan and Trust Corporations Act.45 As mentioned above, section 3(2) was not open to the
defendant; therefore, the plaintiff contended that the defendant was
obliged to register under the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct. In
dealing with this argument the court stated, that if any meaning
38 (1889), 14 A.C. 493, 506:
"it is beyond dispute, too, that we are entitled, and indeed bound,
when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute to consider any other parts of the Act which throws light upon the intention
of the legislature and which may show that the particular provision
ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart
from the rest of the Act."
39 (1906), 12 O.L.R. 240.
40 Id., at 244.
41 The CorporationsAct, 1953 (Ont.), c. 19 (now R.S.O. 1960, c. 71).
42 Supra,note 41, s. 22(1).
43 R.S.O. 1960, c. 244.
44 Id., s. 1(6).
45 R.S.Q. 1960, c. 222.
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were to be given to the defendant's charter, then its business could
not be encompassed by the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct, since
that type of business was strictly prohibited in its Letters Patent.46
Mr. Justice Kelly, while admitting he would find difficulty in delimiting the scope of the defendant's business, rightly pointed out that
the defendant did have certain scope in the field of lending money 47
without registering under the Loan and Trust Corporations Act.
Further, he pointed out that, with a strict etymological application
of the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct, many companies, not now
required to be registered in order to lend money on the security of
real estate, would have to register.
V Equity
In reversing the decision of Mir. Justice Grant, the Court of
Appeal held that the mortgage was valid; however, in order to discuss the equity issues involved, the Appellate Court had to assume
that the mortgage was illegal.43 If this assumption had not been made,
there would have been no justification for discussing equity as a
separate issue, as the parties would have been left to their common
law remedies relating to mortgages.
At trial, after deciding that the mortgage was illegal and void,
Grant J. refused to put the defendant on terms. 49 In Lodge v. National
Union Investment Co.,50 the plaintiff sought to recover certain securities and money that he had given an unregistered money lender for
the renewal of certain bills. Parker J. ordered the mortgagee to give
up the securities, but he also made the plaintiff repay the monies the
plaintiff had borrowed. He reached this conclusion since the action
was based on an equitable claim and not a legal one-thus applying
the maxim, "He who seeks equity must do equity."
In the case of Chapman v. MichaeZson,51 the plaintiff sought a
declaration that a certain transaction under the Money-Lenders Act
[1900] was void since the defendant money-lender was taking security
otherwise than in his registered name. Eve J., in considering whether
he should put the plaintiff on terms before granting him judgment,
distinguished the Lodge case on the grounds that the plaintiff in the
present case was basing his claim in common law and not in equity.
Therefore, he felt that the maxim, "He who seeks equity must do
equity", did not apply.
In the Sidmay case, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that the mortgage was illegal and void. By doing this the plain46

Supra note 1 at 364.

47 Id.

Id., at 375.
In reaching this conclusion Grant J. relied mainly on the cases of:
Chapman v. Michaelson [1908] 1 Ch. 238, Cohen v. J. Lester Ltd. [1948] 4 All
E.R. 188, Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe [1956] 3 All E.R. 266 as effectively overruling
the decision of Parker J. in Lodge v. National Union Investment Co. Ltd.
[1907] 1 Ch. 300.
50 [1907] 1 Ch. 300.
51 [1908] 1 Ch. 238.
48
49

290

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 5:267

tiff contended he was seeking pure common law relief and was not
asking the court to exercise any equitable jurisdiction. However, the
problem here is largely one of semantics, since what in effect the
plaintiff is seeking is to get his land back, because, until the declaration is granted, the legal title to the land is in the defendant company. At common law, the rule was that where there was an illegal
contract the court would let losses lie where they fell; however, if
the plaintiff were asserting any equitable claim the court, as in the
Lodge case, would be justified, in its discretion, putting the plaintiff
on terms-thus, setting aside the common law rule.
On appeal, the court looked at the substance of the relief sought
and not merely to the words used in the pleadings. Mr. Justice Laskin
stated:
. . in seeking a declaration that the mortgage it gave was void, it Is
seeking the aid of the Court to restore to it what it gave up for the
advance received from the mortgagee. In effect, the plaintiff
seeks rescission of the transaction by way of benefit to itself alone.52

As Laskin J.A. rightly pointed out, the plaintiff, in the present case,
is really asking for rescission of the contract and not merely for a
declaration. This type of relief is positive and equitable. As a result,
there is no reason why the plaintiff should not be made to repay the
money lent as a condition precedent to getting his land back. The
correctness of Mr. Justice Laskin's view is borne out by Denning J.
(as he was then) in Nelson v. Larbot 53 where he stated:
It is no longer appropriate, however, to draw a distinction between law
and equity. Principles have now to be stated in light of their combined
effect . . . Remedies now depend on the substance of5 4the right, not on
whether they can be fitted into a particular framework.
This principle, as stated by Denning J., may well be what Mr. Justice
Kelly had in mind when he restricted the case of Chapman v. Michaelson to its own peculiar facts.55
In his judgment, Mr. Justice Grant held that the plaintiff company was one of the class of persons for whose benefit the Loan and
Trust Corporations Act was passed.56 In the Lodge case, Parker J.
stated:
It seems reasonably clear at any rate in equity, if not at law, a person
taking advantage of the exception arising from the fact that he belonged
to the class for whose protection the statutes were passed (Italics added)
could not assert any right unless he himself
was prepared to do what the
court considered fair to the defendant. 57
He went on to say:
As I understand it, the decision amounts to this, that anyone who seeks
relief either at law or in equity (Italics added) and for the purpose of
that relief is obliged to set up an illegal contract, and rely on the excep.
52 Supra note 1 at 385.
53 [1948J 1 K.B. 339.
54 Id., at 343.
55 Supra note 1 at 381.
56 For this reason Grant J. held that the plaintiff was entitled to Its
declaration.
57 BSupra, note 50, at 307.
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tion arising by reason of his being within the protection of the statute
imposing the illegality, is in fact bringing an equitable action,
and will
therefore, be put on terms with regard to the relief granted.5 8
If the Lodge decision still stands,5 9 then it seems that the plaintiff
was asserting the equitable exception as stated by Parker J. It is
arguable that before any person can get a declaration that a contract
is illegal he must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the
prohibitory statute was passed for his benefit. If the plaintiff does
not show that he is one of a class for whom the statute was passed,
then qua him he will not be entitled to a declaration that the contract is illegal and void. For example, in the Sidmay case, it would
be absurd to assume that a person not envisaged by the Act, 60 could
come into court and claim the benefit of the statute. As far as Mr.
Justice Grant is concerned, the plaintiff is a person protected by the
Loan and Trust CorporationsAct. As a result of this, it would seem
to follow that the person is asserting the equitable exception in the
61
Lodge case and should have been put on terms.
Even if Mr. Justice Grant had put the plaintiff on terms, 62 it
must be remembered that although any person, if he is one for whose
benefit a statute was passed, and if he is seeking a declaration of
illegality, must of necessity be in equity, this is not to say that the
court will automatically put him on terms. For instance, if the defendant has perpetrated any fraud or misrepresentation, or has been
guilty of any high-handedness, the court, in its discretion, may refuse
to put the plaintiff on terms.
As has been mentioned, the Court of Appeal came to the opposite
result than that reached at trial.63 Mr. Justice Laskin refused to grant
the plaintiff relief as it was not one of a class of persons for whose
benefit the Act was passed.64 Mr. Justice Kelly also quashed the conclusion reached at trial when he stated:
• I do not consider ...

that a party to an illegal contract may come

to the Court for a declaration of illegality unless he is able to qualify

as belonging to the class for the benefit of which the contracts were
made to be illegal. To be able to invoke the Court's aid in the gaining of
relief from the consequences of their conduct in the contract freely made,
the respondents must demonstrate that they are of the class in whose
favour an exception is made to the general rule of non-access to the
Courts. The respondents are not of this class and so are not entitled to
the relief they seek by having the contract, voluntarily made, declared
to be illegal.65
58 Id., at 308.

59 Grant J. seemed to think that Lodge v. National Union Investment Co.
Ltd. had been effectively overruled by Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe. This aspect of
the decision will be discussed later.
60 Loan and Trust CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 222.
61 This argument could also be applied to Chapman v. Michaelson, where
the plaintiff, although seeking a declaration of ilegality, asserted that the
Money-Lenders Act was for his benefit. As a result, perhaps the distinction
between this case and the Lodge case is invalid.
62 Supra, note 8 at 206.
63 See Statutory Interpretation argument.
64 Supra note 1 at 385.
65 Id., at 381.
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Although the case of Cohen v. J. Lester Ltd.66 was not discussed
in great detail by the Court of Appeal it would seem to merit some
consideration. 67
In this case the plaintiff had deposited jewellry with a moneylender as security for a loan. A memorandum of the contract did not
comply with section 6 of the Money-Lenders Act;68 as a result the
court held that the contract was unenforceable, and not illegal, as
in the Lodge case. Because of this supposed distinction between Megality and unenforceability, the court refused to follow the Lodge
case which would have put the plaintiff on terms. Grant J., in considering Cohen v. J. Lester Ltd., seemed to feel that if the court
could reach this conclusion under an unenforceable contract, then
surely where the contract was illegal (a situation that is far more
serious) the same result should follow.
However, there has been some doubt cast upon the Cohen decision, by Lord Radcliffe in Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe69 where he pointed
out that it is not right to give the defendant more satisfaction under
an illegal contract than under an unenforceable contract. It could be
argued on the basis of what Lord Radcliffe said that the plaintiff
in the Cohen case should have been put on terms, because the situation in that case was far less serious than the illegality situation in
the Lodge case where the plaintiff was put on terms. If this is so,
perhaps Tucker J. in Cohen should have put the plaintiff on terms.
Mr. Justice Grant recognized this fallacy in the law, as pointed
out by Lord Radcliffe, and held that where the defendant was party
to an illegal contract the plaintiff should not be put on terms. But
this is predicated on the assumption that the Cohen case was rightly
decided and the Lodge case has been overruled. If it can be shown
that the Lodge decision is still valid then the Cohen case was poorly
decided since the plaintiff in an unenforceable contract should definitely be put on terms.
Both at trial and on appeal the Courts felt that Kasumu v. Baba
70
Egbe overruled, or at least diminished the effect of, the Lodge case.
In the Kasumu case, Lord Radcliffe, while considering the applicability
of the Lodge case, pointed out that according to the decision in Lodge
a secured creditor is in a more advantageous position than an unsecured creditor; this is so, since an unsecured creditor would have
no right to get his loan back, because if he attempts to sue on the
contract the court will simply dismiss the claim as being founded on
an unenforceable or illegal contract.7 1 Furthermore, the debtor has
66 Supra, note 49.

67 On appeal, Mr. Justice Kelly (at page 378) briefly referred to the case
of Cohen v. J. Lester Ltd. [19481 4 All E.R. 188 (in conjunction with Kasumu
v. Baba-Egbe [19561 3 All E.R. 266) as a case which demonstrated the effect
of Lodge v. National Union Investment Co. Ltd. [19071 1 Ch. 300.
68 1927 (U.K.), c. 21.
69 [19561 3 All E.R. 256, 269.
70 (1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 194, 209; (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358, 378, 384.
71 Supra,note 69 at 271.
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no reason to come to court since he has nothing which he wishes to
get back from the creditor. On the other hand, in the case of a
secured creditor, the debtor must come to court in order to reclaim
his security-in such circumstances the debtor may be put on terms.7 2
As a result of this anamalous situation, both Grant J. and Lord Radcliffe felt that Lodge is no longer a proper decision.
Thus, the issue that arises is posed why an unsecured creditor
should be in a less favourable position than a secured creditor. It is
submitted that the problem presented by this question is more academic than practical for two reasons. In the first place, in modern
business practice it is unrealistic to think of unsecured creditors; this
is especially so under such statutes as the Loan and Trust Corporations Act. Secondly, Lord Radcliffe felt that an unsecured creditor
should be put in the same, if not in a better position, than a secured
creditor-for the unsecured creditor has supposedly acted in a somewhat "noble" and "gratuitous" manner. Theoretically this view is
tenable; however, looking at it practically, any person who lends
money without taking security has poor business acumen, and must
take any risk attendant to his actions; he certainly does not deserve
as favourable a position in the eyes of the court as one who has done
everything to protect himself.
It is interesting to note, that the Court of Appeal while stating
that the Lodge decision had been discredited, was still willing to put
the plaintiff on terms had it been decided that the contract was illegal
and that he belonged to a class of persons intended to be protected
by the Loan and Trust CorporationsAct.7 3 This in effect affirms the
Lodge case. In extending this anomaly even further, Kelly J.A., while
putting the plaintiff on terms, would have required, not only the
repayment of the principal sum, but also the repayment of this sum
at a suitable rate of interest. On this basis, it is arguable that the
Court has extended the principle enunciated by Parker J. in the Lodge
case. Parker J. had ordered repayment of the principal sum only,
and did not deal with interest at all-perhaps to penalize the moneylender to some extent.
Before leaving the area of equity, one more point should be mentioned. When two parties have entered into a contract bargained at
arm's length, it seems that the court may properly leave them to their
rights under the contract. As stated by Mr. Justice Laskin, the parties
in the present case were in "pari delicto". He said:
the plaintiff is not a mere amateur in borrowing money on the

security of real estate any more than the defendant is an amateur lender,

nor is it in the position of having parted with property without the
defendant having performed its side of the bargain. In such circumstances, where the parties have bargained at arm's length and have each
performed, the Court may properly leave them where they are.74
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At trial, Mr. Justice Grant had taken a different approach to
this issue. He remarked that Lord Radcliffe found it impossible to
apply principles developed in connection with usurious contracts to
cases arising under modern legislation. This view is based on the
assumption that under current money-lending contracts the illegality
75
is brought about mainly through the fault of the money-lender.
This presupposes that under the old usurious contracts the parties
were in "pari delicto"; however, under these transactions the moneylender was still in a superior position as he could easily stipulate a
wide range of terms. Thus, logically speaking, if terms were imposed
under usurious contracts there is no reason for not imposing them
under current legislation.
VI Public Policy
Although in the final analysis the appeal was not decided on the
basis of public policy, Kelly J.A. makes it plain from the outset that
any unfavourable consequences that may have resulted from Mr.
Justice Grant's decision should be considered.
It has often been submitted that the courts should disregard the
previous case law that is so divided in opinion as to render it useless,
and approach the problem of statutory interpretation from a common
sense point of view.76 Common sense, in many instances, would seem
to dictate that business done in contravention of a statute is not automatically null and void-i.e. where the consequences would be so
severe as to result in an injustice. Perhaps the courts should approach
the problem by asking whether the enforcement of the transaction
is against public policy. If the contract is declared illegal, what consequences will flow? 77 Is there a penalty provided under the statute?

Once these questions have been considered it will not be necessary
to search for supposed legislative intent. It is interesting to note that
the courts themselves are divided on the question of legislative intent.
Some courts assume, that where a penalty is provided, the contract
itself is illegal; 78 others think it is not.79 In some jurisdictions fine
distinctions are drawn between malum rohibitum and malum in se
when in the opinion of others this distinction is non-existent.8 0
Perhaps the solution to this dilemma would be to disregard the judicial myth of legislative intent and concentrate on a functional approach as embodied in the questions posed above.
In Sidmay the Court of Appeal approached the problem from
the functional point of view. 8' MVr. Justice Kelly felt that if the trial
decision were to be upheld a large amount of conveyancing work
would be rendered uncertain. A vendee assignee, or sub-mortgagee
(1966), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 194, 208.
Gecchorn W., Contracts and Public Policy, 33 Col. L. Rev. 679.
Tellhock advocates this functional test as laid down in the case of
Vita Food Products v. Urius Shipping Company Ltd., [19391 A.C. 277.
78 Bartlett v. Vinoc, [16931 Carth. 252.
79 Montreal Trust v. Abitibi Power and Paper Co., Ltd., et al., [19371
O.R. 939.
80 Restatement of Contracts (1932) p. 580.
81 Supra note I at 362.
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from the defendant would not only be forced to satisfy himself as to
the propriety of title, but also would have to make extensive inquiries
into whether the defendant was properly registered under the act
applicable to the type of business being carried on.82 To expect a
purchaser or assignee from the defendant to ascertain the nature of
the transaction and the type of business carried on may be too onerous.
As pointed out by Lord Wright in Vita Food Products v. Urius
Shipping Company Ltd.,8 3 public policy should be looked at in a wide
sense. Mr. Justice Kelly quotes St. John Shipping Corp. v. J. Rank
Ltd.84 for a similar proposition-when nullification of a bargain would
result in a windfall, public policy would dictate that the contract
84
should be enforced.
It is hoped that in the future other courts will see fit to use the
type of functional analysis demonstrated by the Ontario Court of
Appeal. This type of analysis will often prevent a grave injustice by
averting strict technicalities in the law and enabling the court to
look at the substance of the problem in its social surroundings.
CLIFFORD S. NELSOW
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RAY L. STEELE::

CIVIL RIGHTS
Bintner v. Regina Public School Board District #4
(2d) 646.

(1966) 55 D.L.R.

EXCLUSION OF CHILD PLAINTIFF FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL BECAUSE OF THE
RELIGIOUS FAITH OF HERSELF AND HER PARENTS-SCHOOL COMMUNITY
-SASKATCHEWAN
BILL OF RIGHTS AND RELEVANT SASKATCHEWAN
SCHOOL LEGISLATION-CoMPARATIVE ONTARIO LEGISLATION.

It is with a great deal of dismay that layman and lawyer alike
look to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan. The
case of Bintner v. Regina Public School Board District #4, :' purports
to make religious discrimination in education a matter of provincial
public policy.
The fact that freedom of religion is a basic tenet of the Canadian
political-legal structure,2 seems not however to have imposed itself
upon the thinking of Bence C.J.Q.B., nor Culliton C.J.S. and his
brothers in the Court of Appeal. In view of the continuing public
pressure for equality in all areas of community life in regard to race,
* Clifford S. Nelson, B.A. (U. of Toronto), and *Ray L. Steele, B.A. (U.
of Manitoba) are students entering the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
82 Id.
83 [1939] A.C. 277, 293.
84 [1956] 3 All E.R. 683.
1 (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d) 646.
2 Saumur v. Quebec, [19531 2 S.C.R. 299.

